Failure In Pakistan

The report in yesterday's (6/30/08) New York Times, "Amid Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan," reveals much about the Bush policy in the Persian Gulf.

We read of the plan devised by administration officials in late 2007 to enable American commando forces to operate more smoothly in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan, headquarters of al Qaeda, where peace agreements brokered by President Pervez Musharaff have allowed militants to operate increasingly freely. The plan, however, has stalled amidst bureaucratic in-fighting, a risk-averse attitude in Washington, and excessive concern about imperiling Musharraf's standing among Pakistanis.

The Times reports "it is increasingly clear that the Bush administration will leave office with Al Qaeda having successfully relocated its base from Afghanistan to Pakistan’s tribal areas, where it has rebuilt much of its ability to attack from the region and broadcast its messages to militants across the world." In fact, Pentagon consultant and RAND Corporation terrorism expert Seth Jones explains "the United States faces a threat from Al Qaeda today that is comparable to what it faced on Sept. 11, 2001.”

Those who imply that diminished American casualties in Iraq during the "surge" justify continuation, or even launch, of the war should heed this important observation by The Times reporters: "current and former military and intelligence officials said that the war in Iraq consistently diverted resources and high-level attention from the tribal areas." Consequently, according to the Times, "leading terrorism experts have warned that it is only a matter of time before a major terrorist attack planned in the mountains of Pakistan is carried out on American soil." Yet another unintended consequence of Bush's folly.